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A PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

Mr. Acheson argues that Khrushchev will be deterred from his purpose in Berlin only if he believes the United States will go to nuclear war to thwart it. Such a threat, Mr. Acheson says, is not now credible. Therefore we must take the preparatory measures to make it so.

If these premises were sound, Khrushchev would now be blocking the access routes to Berlin, since according to these premises, we do not presently have a credible threat of nuclear war to deter him.

But what deters Khrushchev from moving against Berlin is a composite of forces ranged against him, of which military force is only one component. In addition, he must reckon with legal, political, economic and other vulnerabilities of his position. The program of action outlined in the Russian side-memoire is designed to alter this mix of forces to the point where the Communists will feel it is sufficiently favorable

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to warrant action.

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It follows that we can counter his program and strengthen our own position by effective action on the political, diplomatic, psychological and economic fronts.

In developing such a program, the role of negotiations is critical.

A lengthy period of formal negotiations would serve the following purposes:

clarification of Soviet objectives and intentions;

clarification and narrowing of the issues in contention;

ready concerting of Western diplomatic and political response to Soviet actions;

education of public opinion here and abroad to the facts and necessities of the situation;

deferral, for a considerable period, of unilateral Soviet action;

demonstration of Soviet intransigence to allies and neutrals.

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It is not impossible, finally, that negotiations will produce an agreement consistent with our objectives.

Some of the purposes can also be served by other activities, but negotiations will materially further all of them. Such values should not be lightly sacrificed.

Negotiations should begin before any major overt measures of military preparation, such as a Presidential declaration of limited national emergency. Such measures are inherently provocative.

It is argued however that a declaration of limited national emergency and other ostentatious military measures are necessary almost immediately -- at latest by mid-Fall. Otherwise the extra conventional forces for the six-division exercise would not be available when needed at the end of the year. This would preclude fruitful negotiations in advance of emergency military measures. Negotiations would be deferred until a Berlin crisis of severe intensity had been developed.

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The argument for an early declaration of limited national emergency should be carefully examined. It assumes the Khrushchev timetable by which a separate treaty with the GDR would be signed some time around the end of 1961 followed fairly soon by some interference with access to Berlin. In the past, however, political countermeasures have shattered every previous Soviet "deadline" on Berlin.

More important, it is not clear that emergency expansion of conventional military capacity is needed for a military demonstration of the required magnitude. The Acheson paper assumed that any conventional attack would be quickly defeated or contained. It asks for an engagement big enough to involve Soviet troops and lasting long enough to sharply increase the risk of rapid escalation into general nuclear war. Would a two division probe (which could be manned without partial mobilization) be less suited to these purposes than a six division probe? Mr. Bohlen concludes that

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that:

"...the actual value of the increased military force would seem to be a secondary point. Therefore, there would not seem to be any great urgency as to timing beyond these measures which could be taken now without formal Congressional action or Presidential proclamation."

The remainder of this paper proceeds on the assumption that it is decided to defer a declaration of national emergency as well as other countermeasures of an emergency character until after a serious negotiating effort has been made.

The period of action may then be divided into five stages:

- I. From now to the German elections.
- II. Between the German elections and the beginning of negotiations.
- III. The stage of negotiation.
- IV. From end of negotiations to interference with ground access to Berlin.
- V. After interference with access.

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The object of this exercise is to avoid stage V completely and perhaps stage IV as well. To do so will require a careful mix of military, political, economic and psychological activity in each prior stage.

STAGE I -- THE PERIOD FROM NOW TO THE GERMAN ELECTIONS

A. Political

1. Clarifying the Western position.

Public statements should avoid excessive pre-occupation with the narrow legal question of occupation rights in Berlin and should emphasize the principle of protecting the self-determination of the people of Berlin. They should not, of course, disclaim reliance on legal rights, but should show the relevance of those rights to the broader goal of protecting West Berlin's freedom. They should also stress that our rights involve a corresponding duty on the part of the Soviets, an obligation not only to respect the rights but to act affirmatively to maintain them.

The President's draft statement for release with the

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answer to the aide-memoire is an important step in this direction. It should set the theme for comprehensive statements by other leaders. A Concurrent Resolution of the Congress endorsing that statement should be considered.

We should also seek ways to dramatize the fact that West Berlin's present status is freely chosen, e.g., calling for an all-Berlin plebiscite, and visits of democratically elected West Berlin officials to other countries.

All these elements should be worked into a comprehensive UKIA program for world-wide dissemination.

2. Clarifying Russia's purpose.

Mr. Bohlen suggests that a series of exploratory private talks with the Soviets would be useful. They should be undertaken by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, directly with Khrushchev if possible. In the initial phases he should seek to put a series of questions and probes to get a better idea of what Khrushchev's plans are for allied access to and presence in Berlin if and

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when he signs a German peace treaty. Khrushchev's responses will undoubtedly be ambiguous, but they will provide a basis for further questions and probes, and perhaps for some proposals. The latter should come, however, only if it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood of a constructive response. Affirmative proposals should probably be presented in the framework of all-German problems rather than simply the Berlin problem, to avoid being trapped into limited bargaining on Berlin.

3. Concerting the alliance.

We should begin now to canvass alternatives with the principal allies so as to develop an agreed course of action which could be put to NATO in time for some free discussion. Mr. Acheson has reminded us that the duty of the leader of an alliance, as opposed to a group of satellites, is to convince his allies that their interests as well as those of the leader are being served. This process requires not only consultation but full consideration of their views before irrevocable decisions are made.

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The consultations should be initiated by high-level correspondence. If the experience with the aide-memoire is to be avoided, a working group should be assigned to define issues rather than to settle on an agreed text. The consultations should culminate towards the end of August in visits among foreign ministers of the four principal allies preparatory to presenting proposals to NATO.

4. Neutrals.

The Neutrals' summit conference in Bled, Yugoslavia, beginning September 1 will provide opportunity for widely publicized discussion of the Berlin problem. We should begin now to seek means by which such discussion could be used to our advantage -- for example by a call for maintenance of the status quo pending negotiations between the parties. The UK should begin to sound out Commonwealth nations attending the conference as to the prospects for discussion of Berlin at this conference and seek to guide them in the appropriate direction. Depending on what such inquiries

reveal,

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reveal, Ambassador Kennan might be instructed to approach the Yugoslav government to the same effect. Apart from the neutral nations Conference, Yugoslavia is strategic in both political and military terms. Ambassador Kennan should be asked for his recommendations of a course of action designed to develop support for our position, or at least to minimize support for the Soviet position by Yugoslavia. At a minimum Tito's basic interest in preserving stability in central Europe should be brought home to him.

B. Economic

1. We should begin immediately with European and other allied countries on a contingency plan basis:

a. a detailed series of economic sanctions graduated in intensity from embargoes limited by commodity and area up to complete interruption of economic intercourse with the Soviet bloc. Measures which are annoying without having real economic effect should be avoided.

b. needed authorizing legislation so that all participating governments will be able to

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move swiftly to apply sanctions when required.

Where possible, such legislation should be enacted on a standby basis.

c. detailed programs for replacing sources of supply now dependent upon bloc production. Participating countries must be convinced that an orderly, workable procedure for sharing the burden of economic sanctions and Soviet counter-measures has been developed. It should be made clear that these measures will not be invoked until the possibilities of negotiation have been fully explored.

2. We should immediately strengthen the economic capacity of West Berlin itself to sustain a prolonged crisis. This might include some increase in stockpiles as well as other measures e.g. to cushion unemployment and other hardships resulting from temporary cut-off of export markets. A standby plan for use of idle labor and capacity for construction work within Berlin itself during such a period might have important psychological and political impacts.

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C. Military

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C. Military

The West, and in particular the United States, should take the following steps:

1. Measures to increase military readiness, in the short term, including

a. Steps so that by early 1962, the United States and Western Allies will be able to supply West Berlin by military and civilian airlift despite intense passive resistance and harassment.

b. Bringing troop units presently in Europe up to full strength, and up to improved state of combat readiness, but without increases in force levels which depend on a declaration of emergency.

c. Redeployment of some United States forces to Europe on a modest scale.

d. Preparatory actions such as stocking up dispersal sites for U. S. strategic strike forces, improvement of capability for air-borne alert and for strategic bomber dispersal; and in

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general the remainder of the military measures numbered 1-12 in the task force report.

2. Longer range defense measures. ~~16114416/~~

The Soviet leaders will react to big shifts of effort on the part of the United States and its allies, and especially to long-term commitment of substantial additional resources to defense activities. Indeed, such action might seem even more dangerous to the Soviets than a series of high-intensity short-term measures geared directly to the Berlin crisis. They would have to think in terms of a permanent jump in the order of magnitude of the Western defense capability like that involved in the formation of the NATO alliance or in the period after the attack on Korea.

Though measures of this kind would be translated into increased military capability more slowly than emergency measures, Soviet leaders would have to take them into account from the outset of the program. In

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defense planning and production the Soviets, too, must reckon with the problems of lead time. The greater unused capacity in the Western economies gives us a comparative advantage in long range plans for increased military production.

To this end, the President should press for prompt Congressional action on the military and scientific measures in his second State of the Union message (\$2-\$3 billion for military measures and a major long-range space program).

Consideration should be given to the development of a defense program on the assumption that defense budgets would be increased by \$10 - \$15 billion annually. The elements of this program should be publicly discussed and possibly even presented before Congressional committees. The President and military leaders should state that they will seek authority for such a program if in the coming months the Soviets demonstrate continued intransigence on Berlin and other issues of East-West confrontation. These statements, however, should be coordinated with diplomatic and political activity designed to indicate our willingness to enter early negotiations.

STAGE II -- BETWEEN THE GERMEN ELECTIONS
AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

A. Political

1. United Nations. The UN General Assembly begins September 19, two days after the German elections. If the Berlin situation seems threatening at that time, it is almost certain to be discussed in the United Nations. In those circumstances it will be desirable for the United States to take the initiative to inscribe the Berlin issue on the agenda and to propose a resolution calling upon the parties to settle their differences by negotiation and to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of such negotiations. (The United Nations paper attached spells out this course in some detail).

2. Call for a peace conference.

Negotiations should begin in an all-German framework. A proposal for an all-European framework would be impossibly Utopian. At the other extreme, we should not begin negotiating about Berlin itself

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since we will then have put ourselves under great pressure to make bargaining concessions. The best way to keep the discussion in an all-German setting, against Soviet efforts to alter the framework of discussion, is to conduct negotiations for a German peace treaty. The Soviet aide-memoire indicates Khrushchev's intention to call for a German peace conference shortly after the Communist Party Congress. We could wait and accept their invitation. Without precluding that course, it seems desirable that the West take the initiative at this point.

Therefore, after the German elections, but before or at the very beginning of the Communist Party conference, the US, the UK and France should issue a joint call for a peace conference for Germany. The call would cover the following points:

- a. Membership -- all major powers which fought against Germany. East and West Germany would be represented under the same rubric as they were at the 1955

Geneva

Geneva conference; but without any
rigamarole about how far they sit from
the table.

b. The principles of a settlement,
including:

confirmation of existing external
boundaries of Germany;

free choice of the resulting
Germany in foreign and military
policy;

(no punitive exactions on any
war claims remaining outstanding);

adoption of the treaty by an all-
German government based on free
elections. The treaty would contain
a plan for securing such a government.

Within the framework of these principles
the call may be drafted to explain potential

discussion

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STAGE III -- NEGOTIATIONS

A. Political.

1. United Nations. Report on negotiations from time to time as indicated by the situation in the peace conference and in the United Nations.

2. Peace conference.

a. Debate initial US and Soviet drafts. These are probably non-negotiable. The major stumbling block is the question of unification.

b. Fall-backs. After an impasse has been reached on the initial drafts, the duration of the conference will be determined largely by the ability of the US to develop a series of persuasive and reasonable fall-back positions which may serve the purpose both of clarifying and narrowing outstanding issues and of continuing to put on the Soviets the onus

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undertakings as to nuclear weapons
in Berlin;

confirmation of the Oder-Neisse
line;

a non-aggression pact between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO alliance.

4. Outside events.

Once negotiations have been undertaken, their course will not be affected only, or perhaps primarily, by what is said at the conference table. External events have played a major role in all of the negotiations held with the Soviets since World War II which produced results -- lifting the Berlin blockade, terminating the occupation of Austria, and ending the Korean War. Such events might include disturbances within the Soviet bloc or the death of a principal figure. It was Stalin's death, more than any other factor, that brought the Korean War to an end. The death of Khrushchev or Adenauer might have comparable impact now.

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Some sharply unfavorable possibilities can be envisaged, like increased pressure in Laos or the Taiwan Straits. But favorable developments, not altogether beyond our control, can also be imagined. In this category might fall a major scientific breakthrough or increased integration of Western Europe.

The point to be stressed is that the world is not static outside the conference hall. The longer negotiations continue, the greater the chances for some decisive event in the outer world which will resolve the crisis. In this sense, time is not necessarily against us.

B. Military and Economic.

Continuation and perfection of measures specified in Stage I.

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STAGE IV -- THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS TO
INTERFERENCE WITH GROUND ACCESS
TO BERLIN

It is possible, of course, that the negotiations will fizzle out, as they have in the past, with a tacit agreement on all sides to do nothing. If so, the problem is over. If however the conference breaks off under circumstances of high tension, we should then begin to initiate more drastic measures. If the conference breaks down in such circumstances, the result can probably be anticipated by several weeks and emergency preparations set in train.

A. Military -- Take the remaining steps needed to bring our forces to the necessary state of readiness and capability in the shortest possible time. If a declaration of national emergency is still required it should be made at this time.

B. Economic -- Countermeasures should be applied in the pre-determined sequence.

C. Political -- Depending upon the circumstances in which the conference breaks down, the

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the state of the issues, and the political postures of the parties, we should consider taking the question to a summit meeting or to the UN. In a summit meeting, if the crisis were very intense, real possibilities for an all-European settlement might open up. A schematic discussion of UN action at this stage is presented in the UN paper attached.

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STAGE V -- INTERFERENCE WITH CROSSLAND
ACCESS TO HEALTH

If, after the breakdown of negotiations, the authorities in East Germany either before or after the signature of a separate treaty, alter existing procedures governing civilian or military access to Berlin, we should take the following actions:

A. Military: Begin supply of Berlin by air.

B. Economic: Full scale embargo of the Soviet bloc as per plan.

C. Political: Take the issue to the UN Security Council in accordance with the plan outlined in the attached paper.

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If at this stage supply of Berlin by air is actively interdicted, or if it fails to maintain Berlin, the President must decide whether in the circumstances then prevailing large scale ground action along the access routes carrying a high likelihood of general nuclear war, is indicated.

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